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Introduction
Since the early 1980s, the U.S. banking indus-
try has seen a strong trend toward consolida-
tion, partly because of state regulatory changes
permitting out-of-state bank acquisitions. There
were 6,157 bank mergers and acquisitions
(M&As) between 1981 and 1994 (Rhoades
[1996]). Consolidation of this magnitude has
brought significant changes to the banking sec-
tor that are in themselves worth investigating.
By identifying these changes, we also gain
valuable information about the ongoing wave
of M&As that began with enactment of the
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency
Act in 1994.1  Moreover, M&As require regula-
tors’ preapproval, and information on the
likely effects of such changes can be useful in
the approval process.
A prime objective of research on bank M&As
has been to identify motives for consolidation.
Such motives as scale economies, scope econ-
omies, and managerial X-efficiencies have been
studied extensively.2  However, less attention has
been given to the other two most frequently
suggested motives for bank M&As: risk diversi-
fication, and the wish to become “too big (or
too important) to fail.”3  The present paper con-
tributes to the literature by evaluating the im-
portance of the risk diversification motive. Our
study considers only bank acquisitions, which
differ from mergers in that the acquired bank
continues to operate as an institution after
being acquired; it does not lose its charter. This
focus on acquisitions allows us to identify how
each party—-the acquirer and the acquired
bank—affects the risk of failure of the newly
formed banking organization.
The paper proceeds as follows: The next sec-
tion discusses the importance of the risk di-
versification motive and defines our contribu-
tion to the related literature. Section II presents
n 1 The Act defined nationwide standards for a bank holding com-
pany (BHC) to acquire a bank in any state. Moreover, beginning June 1,
1997, BHCs were allowed to convert their bank subsidiaries into a network
of branches, provided that these banks’ home states had not opted out of
the Act’s branching provision.
n 2 Useful reviews of the literature on economies of scale and scope
are presented by Clark (1988) and Mudur (1992). Berger, Hunter, and
Timme (1993) review the literature on X-efficiencies.
n 3 Hunter and Wall (1989) and Boyd and Graham (1991), among
others, raise the possibility that banks seek to become larger in order to
increase their deposit insurance subsidy by being considered too big (or
too important) to fail.
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the measures of risk and our method for identi-
fying the acquisition effects. Section III de-
scribes our sample of bank acquisitions, and
section IV presents the results. The paper closes
with some final remarks on the policy implica-
tions of our study.
I. The Risk 
Diversification
Motive
In the debate on the risk diversification motive
for bank M&As, some argue that banks choose
targets that allow for a significant reduction in
their risk exposure. Others suggest that, be-
cause of the moral hazard created by deposit
insurance, a merger or acquisition gives the ac-
quiring bank a good opportunity to increase its
deposit insurance subsidy either by increasing
its risk exposure or by attempting to become
too big to fail. Still others say that risk consid-
erations play no significant role in banks’
merger policies. 
Despite the importance of this debate, little 
is known about the risk effects of bank M&As.
On the one hand, the research on postmerger
effects has concentrated on performance (prof-
its and costs) and on the changes in asset man-
agement (composition of the bank’s portfolio of
assets) resulting from the merger or acquisition.
On the other hand, research on the risk effects
of acquisitions has focused on combinations of
banks and nonbank financial firms.4
The indirect evidence on the importance of
the risk diversification motive is somewhat
mixed. For example, Lawrence (1967), Talley
(1971), Ware (1973), and Hobson, Maston, and
Severiens (1978) find that acquired banks tend
to adjust the composition of their portfolios by
switching out of U.S. government securities in
to loans and state and local government secur-
ities. These studies report mixed effects on the
acquired bank’s capital–asset ratio. Rhoades
(1987), Fraser and Kolari (1987), and Beatty,
Santomero, and Smirlock (1987) find a negative
relationship between the merger premium and
the target bank’s capital–asset ratio. Craig and
Santos (1996) show that regardless of the ac-
quired bank’s characteristics, the acquiring insti-
tution changes the target bank’s asset composi-
tion so that the resulting organization becomes
a bigger version of the acquirer. When Rose
(1989) asked managers of banks involved in
mergers to indicate the motives for consolida-
tion, risk reduction was one of the least fre-
quently mentioned responses.
The only study we know that directly com-
pares the importance of the risk reduction mo-
tive with the deposit subsidy enhancement
motive is Benston, Hunter, and Wall (1995).
They conjecture that acquirers seeking to re-
duce risk should be willing to pay a premium
for target banks that will lower the risk of the
new banking organization. Under this hypothe-
sis, there should be a negative relationship be-
tween the purchase premium and the target’s
expected contribution to the risk of the new or-
ganization, which they proxy by the variance of
the target’s return on assets and the covariance
between the acquirer’s and the target’s return
on assets, both computed prior to the acquisi-
tion. If the acquirer uses the acquisition to
increase its deposit insurance subsidy instead, it
can accomplish this objective either by be-
coming too big to fail or by increasing its risk
exposure. Under this hypothesis, the purchase
premium should be positively related to the two
measures of risk already mentioned and to the
acquirer’s risk (as measured by the variance of
its return on assets), and negatively related to
the ratio of the acquirer’s book value of equity
to its total asset value. Benston, Hunter, and
Wall contend that their results are consistent
with the hypothesis of reducing risk and incon-
sistent with that of enhancing the deposit insur-
ance subsidy.
The present study follows a different route
for evaluating the importance of the risk diversi-
fication motive for bank acquisitions. We con-
jecture that if it were an important motive, a
reduction in risk should follow the acquisition.
That is, the postacquisition risk of the newly
formed organization should be lower than the
preacquisition risk of the acquiring bank hold-
ing company (BHC).
In assessing the importance of risk diversifi-
cation, we use several measures to compare
the postacquisition risk of the newly formed
banking organization with the preacquisition
risk of the acquiring BHC. To determine the
source of risk effects resulting from the acquisi-
tion, we also compare the same measures of
risk before and after acquisition for both insti-
tutions. Furthermore, we compare the new
banking organization’s risk with that of the
hypothetical banking organization that would
result from the preacquisition aggregation of
the acquiring and the acquired banks. The pur-
pose of this comparison is to gain information
on how consolidation has affected the banking
industry’s overall risk.
n 4 See, for example, Litan (1987), Santomero and Chung (1992),
and Boyd, Graham, and Hewitt (1993).
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We complement the above analysis by ex-
amining the dynamics of the risk effects caused
by bank acquisitions, using a constant sample.
That is, for a given time frame, defined around
the acquisition date, we consider only acquisi-
tions for which we have observations through-
out the entire period, and then study the dy-
namics of the risk effects within that interval.
Thus, we avoid two problems that are fre-
quently encountered in the literature on post-
acquisition effects: having a sample whose
composition changes over time, and having 
a sample of acquisitions that all occur at the
same time.
II. Method and the
Measurement of Risk
We identify the risk effects of bank acquisitions
through a two-step procedure. First, we com-
pute the risk for the banking organizations in
our sample, both before and after the acquisi-
tion. We then normalize this measure by sub-
tracting the mean of the same measure calcu-
lated for the set of all banks in the industry,
excluding those in our sample. By doing so,
we eliminate a time effect—that is, a shock to
the risk that prevails in the entire industry dur-
ing a given period. In the second step, we
evaluate the acquisition effect by computing
the difference (postacquisition minus preacqui-
sition) between the two industry-normalized
measures calculated in the first step. This pro-
cedure removes any individual effect, that is,
any idiosyncratic risk associated with the bank-
ing organizations involved in the acquisition.
We then test statistically for whether this differ-
ence is zero. A number significantly different
from zero indicates that the acquisition caused
a change in risk.
In this study, we consider three indicators
that are generally adopted in the literature to
measure a banking organization’s risk. The first
two are the standard deviation and the coeffi-
cient of variation of a bank’s profitability. These
measures are computed for both the return on
assets (the ratio of net income to total assets)
and the return on equity (the ratio of net
income to equity capital). The third indicator is
what has become known in the literature as the
Z-score, a measure of a bank’s probability of
bankruptcy.5  In addition, because of their
importance in defining some of these risk indi-
cators, we study an acquisition’s impact on both
the profitability (return on assets and return on
equity) of the banking organizations involved
and the covariance between the profitability of
the acquiring and target banks.
The Z-score can be defined as follows: Let
bankruptcy be the situation in which the bank’s
equity capital, E, is smaller than its losses, –p
(since p represents the bank’s profits); that is, 
E <  –p. In addition, let A be the bank’s total
assets, r  the bank’s return on assets, r = p/A,
and k the negative of the equity-to-assets ratio,
k = –E/A. Using these definitions, the bank’s
probability of bankruptcy can be written as





where p(?) is a probability, p ~ and r ~ repre-
sent random variables, and f(r) is the density
function. 
If r ~ is assumed to have a normal distribu-
tion, then the bank’s probability of bankruptcy
can be rewritten in terms of the standard nor-
mal density, C(?), as 





where z = r ~ – r
s and z = 
k – r
s , with r being the
true mean and s the standard deviation of the
random variable r ~.6
The Z-score, or sample estimate of –z
(because z , 0), is computed using the sample
estimates of r and s. As a result, based on
quarterly accounting data, the Z-score is
defined for each bank as
where the stock variables, equity, and assets
are measured at the midpoint of the period,
and n is the number of periods considered in
the sample.7
n 5 For detailed analyses of this measure of risk, see Meinster and
Johnson (1979) and Boyd, Graham, and Hewitt (1993).
n 6 Because of Chebyshev’s inequality, we know that regardless of
the distribution of r ~, as long as rand s exist, the upper bound to the









n 7 Because we consider only the acquisition of banks, and not
BHCs, the computation of the Z-score for the target bank is straightforward.
The same holds when the acquisition is made by a BHC that owns only one
bank. When a multibank BHC makes the acquisition, the Z-score is com-
puted for the hypothetical bank created as the sum of the banks in the
acquiring BHC.
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The Z-score is an indicator of a bank’s prob-
ability of bankruptcy in the sense that it esti-
mates the number of standard deviations below
the mean that the institution’s profits would
have to fall before its equity became negative.
Thus, the smaller the value of Z, the larger the
bank’s risk of failure. Looking at the definition
of Z, we observe that its value depends posi-
tively on the bank’s profitability (measured by
its return on assets) and capital–asset ratio, and
negatively on the variability of the bank’s prof-
its (measured by the standard deviation of its
return on assets).
In the second step of our procedure, we
identify the acquisition effects by comparing
before and after measures of risk and profitabil-
ity for different banking organizations. By sub-
tracting the preacquisition measure from the
postacquisition measure, we can gauge the con-
sequences of acquisition for the individual bank
(or group of banks) affected. The individual dif-
ferences are averaged and a standard t-test is
used to check whether the means equals zero.
We account for the market effects on our risk
measures by normalizing them with corre-
sponding statistics for the banking industry as a
whole. Each risk measure is computed as a
deviation from the industry average for the
same time period. Take, for example, the case
of the Z-statistic in the 4 by 16 sample. As we
did with the banks in our sample, we computed
the Z-statistic for each bank outside our sample
using quarterly data for the year before the ac-
quisition quarter and for each of the four years
after the acquisition. The average for the indus-
try (which excludes the banks in our sample) is
subtracted from the corresponding statistic for
the acquisition pair. This removes effects that
influence not only the acquisition pair, but also
the industry as a whole. Thus, each measure 
of risk is expressed as a deviation from the
industry average.
Because the sample sizes were large—173
or 201 acquisition pairs, depending on the time
frame—standard central-limit-theorem results
could be expected to hold fairly closely. It is
important to note that the measures of risk all
use sample means that are calculated separately
for each period and each bank. Furthermore,
the sample size is based on the number of indi-
vidual pairs, not on the number of pair–quarter
observations. While this procedure is robust to
changing sample means or an unspecified sto-
chastic process in the return (such as a first-
order autoregressive process), our test is con-
servative in the sense that it tends to reject less
often than a more fully specified statistical
model. However, because our results generally
rejected at a high level or did not reject at any
reasonable level of significance, we report tests
for the robust statistical model.
III. Sample
Construction
Our study reports results only for acquisitions in
which a bank continues to exist after being
acquired by another banking organization. Fur-
thermore, we restrict our sample to acquisitions
made by one-tier BHCs, which own banks but
do not own other BHCs. The data for this study
were obtained from banks’ quarterly Reports of
Condition and Income (call reports) for the first
quarter of 1984 through the last quarter of 1993.
Table 1 summarizes our sample of 256 bank
acquisitions. Note that the largest number of ac-
quisitions (196) was made by BHCs that had
one bank and acquired a second during the
sample period. Note also that several BHCs
made more than one acquisition during our
sample period. For example, there were seven
BHCs that had one bank when the period 
began and later acquired a second bank and
then a third.
Table 2 contains some descriptive statistics
on the ratio of acquired banks’ assets to those of
the largest bank in the acquiring BHC. This in-
formation is arranged according to the number
of banks in the acquiring BHC. For example, in
nine acquisitions, BHCs with three banks
acquired a fourth and, on average, the acquired
banks’ assets were 46 percent of those of the
largest of the three banks in the acquiring BHC.
T A B L E 1
Sample Composition
Number of Banks in the BHCs 
after the Latest Acquisition
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 196 7 — — — — — — — —
2 — 24 1 — — — — — — —
3 — — 7 1 — — — — — —
4 — — — 3 1 — — — — —
5 — — — — 2 — — — — —
6 — — — — — 1 — — — —
7 — — — — — — — 1 — —
… — — — — — — — — — —
10 — — — — — — — — — 1
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As expected, acquired banks are substantially
smaller on average than their acquirers.
We conduct our tests on samples of bank
acquisitions that are held constant within a
given time frame, that is, an interval with a set
number of quarters before and after the acqui-
sition date. By constant sample, we mean a
sample of acquisitions, each of which satisfies
two criteria: first, availability of data on both
parties involved in the acquisition throughout
the entire time frame; second, structural con-
stancy, meaning that the parties involved made
no further bank acquisitions or sales during the
period defined by the time frame. 
This study employs two time frames. The
first includes acquisitions for which we have
the appropriate data for eight quarters before
and eight quarters after the acquisition. In this
case, we compare the risk measures for these
two intervals. The second time frame includes
four quarters prior to the acquisition and 16
quarters after it. Here, we compare the meas-
ures of risk for the four quarters prior to the
acquisition with the same measures computed
for the four quarters of the first year after acqui-
sition, for the four quarters of the second year,
and so on, through the fourth year after acqui-
sition. This broader horizon allows us to iden-
tify the dynamics of the risk effects during the
four years following the acquisition.
Given these conditions, we were able to
consider 201 bank acquisitions in the 8 by 8
time frame and 173 in the 4 by 16 time frame.
The temporal distribution of these acquisitions
is presented in figures 1 and 2, respectively.
IV. Results
Before presenting the results of our tests on the
risk effects of bank acquisitions, it is important
to compare our sample of banks to the industry
as a whole, before and after acquisition. The
acquirers in our sample have a higher return on
assets and a higher return on equity than the
industry average in both periods. Acquired
banks, however, according to both measures of
profitability, are below the industry average
before being acquired, but above it afterward.
Furthermore, the improvement in their prof-
itability increases with time.
With respect to risk, our sample of acquirers
is made up of banks that appear safer than the
industry average, both before and after making
their acquisitions. This is clearest when risk is
measured by the standard deviations of the 
return on assets and on equity. It is less clear
when risk is measured by the Z-score, because
F I G U R E 1
Distribution of Bank Acquisitions
in the 8 by 8 Time Frame
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
F I G U R E 2
Distribution of Bank Acquisitions
in the 4 by 16 Time Frame
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
T A B L E 2
Acquired Bank’s Assets/Assets 
of Largest Bank in Acquiring BHC
Number of Banks in the Acquiring BHC
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Na 203 32 9 5 3 1 1 1 — 1
Mean 0.56 0.63 0.46 0.18 0.31 0.49 0.11 0.06 — 0.06
Median 0.43 0.43 0.30 0.17 0.31 0.49 0.11 0.06 — 0.06
CV b 0.53 0.72 0.36 0.11 0.19 — — — — —
a. Number of acquiring BHCs.
b. Coefficient of variation.
SOURCE:  Authors’ calculations.
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in some periods the acquirers do not differ sta-
tistically from the industry. The results are in-
conclusive when risk is measured by the coeffi-
cients of variation of the returns on both assets
and equity. Target banks are riskier than the
industry before being acquired, according to
both the standard deviation measures and the
Z-score. Afterward, their difference from the in-
dustry as a whole shrinks; in fact, they become
relatively safer, according to the standard devia-
tion measures of risk. As with the acquirers, no
clear results are obtained from the targets’ coef-
ficients of variation.
The results of our tests for the effects of bank
acquisitions are shown in the appendix (tables
A1 to A4). In each time frame, every cell is asso-
ciated with every measure of risk or profitability
and each type of institution. The cell’s first line
represents the mean of the “after” minus the
“before” difference for the statistic associated
with that column. The former is defined as the
postacquisition difference for that statistic be-
tween the sample and the control group, that is,
the industry as a whole (excluding the banks in
our sample). The “before” difference is defined
the same way, but it is computed before the
acquisition. The second line represents the p-
value for the null hypothesis that the “after” mi-
nus the “before” difference is zero. The p-value
is calculated using the standard t-distribution.
For example, the cell in table A1 associated with
acquired banks and the standard deviation of
the return on assets, SA, indicates that the mean
of this measure of risk, after adjusting for the in-
dustry effect, was smaller (by an amount equal
to 0.0011) for the period encompassing eight
postacquisition quarters than the mean that
existed for the same length of time before the
acquisition. The hypothesis that this number is
zero has a p-value of 7.94 3 10–9, which means
that no difference between the two measures
would be rejected at any reasonable level of sig-
nificance. It is evident that the standard devia-
tion of the return on assets for the acquired
banks decreases as a result of acquisition.
A detailed analysis of tables A1 through A4
reveals some clear results. First, the new bank-
ing organizations that emerge from acquisitions
show improved profitability, which increases
with time. Indeed, the profitability of these
organizations ultimately exceeds that of the
associated acquirers prior to acquisition. It also
surpasses the preacquisition profitability of the
hypothetical institutions that result from the
aggregation of the acquirers and the target
banks. The improvement is explained by the
increased profitability of both the acquirers
and the acquired institutions, but particularly
by the latter. These patterns are observed for
the returns on assets and equity.
Second, the variability of new banking orga-
nizations’ returns is reduced (as measured by
both the standard deviation of the return on
assets and the standard deviation of the return
on equity) as a result of acquisitions when
compared to the corresponding preacquisition
variability of both the acquirers’ and the hypo-
thetical institutions’ returns. The variability of
returns decreases over time and is observed for
both the acquirers and the acquired. As in the
case of profitability, the reduction is more pro-
nounced for the latter.
Third, based on the Z-score, we observe that
the new organizations which emerge from
acquisitions have a lower probability of failure
than the hypothetical preacquisition organiza-
tions. Furthermore, this improvement increases
over time (recall that the larger the value of the
Z-score, the smaller the bank’s risk of failure).
Acquired banks follow nearly the same pattern.
However, acquisitions do not affect the Z-
scores of acquirers in a statistically significant
way. An identical conclusion is reached when
the postacquisition Z-scores of new banking
organizations are compared to the correspond-
ing acquirers’ preacquisition Z-scores.
Following the leads of other researchers, we
have also examined changes in the coefficient
of variation and in the covariance. While these
results seem to contradict those of other meas-
ures, careful consideration of the statistical
properties of the two measures leads us to urge
caution in using them to evaluate the risk effects
of acquisitions. In the case of the coefficient of
variation, the lack of a clear result is seemingly
related to the fact that random draws of a vari-
able 1/t, where t is a random variable from a
student t-distribution, has a mean that quickly
approaches a limiting Cauchy distribution. Our
results were strongly influenced in ways that are
typical of those caused by the Cauchy distribu-
tion’s lack of statistical moments. Often, for ex-
ample, computations of industry means for the
coefficient of variation depended completely on
the behavior of one or two huge outliers. Even
trimming the industry means did not completely
solve these problems. Our experience with the
coefficient of variation provides a strong cau-
tionary moral for researchers who forget that
central-limit theorems depend on the existence
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of finite moments greater than two. The coeffi-
cient of variation behaves too much like a
Cauchy variable to depend on such statistical
results. For handling this problematic variable,
we advise using procedures that take the
median as a basis for location estimation.8
Similar results were also obtained for the
covariance risk measure, although it is unlikely
that these are due to observations being drawn
from a distribution with no finite moments. In
this case, we did not normalize for industry
averages. The industry as a whole consists of
individual banks rather than pairs, so that an
industry mean could not be subtracted. Given
that the effects of acquisition on the covariance
measure are slight, our results seem to be in-
fluenced most by random noise and therefore
provide little in the way of information about
small effects that may be due to acquisitions.
Clearly, acquisition does not change the covar-
iance measure enough to make it detectable
using our methods.
In sum, we find that acquisitions have a posi-
tive impact on the profitability of participating
institutions—particularly acquired banks—and
that it increases over time. This improvement, in
turn, reduces the variability of the institutions’
profits in a similar fashion. These results, a pri-
ori, would appear to contribute to participating
banks’ reduced probability of failure, as mea-
sured by the Z-score. In fact, this is true for
acquired banks and for the new banking organi-
zations that result from acquisitions when these
are compared to hypothetical preacquisition
organizations. However, this reduction is not
observed when the comparison is made with
preacquisition acquirers’ risk, nor is it seen for
acquirers. These results may be explained by
the difference in capitalization between ac-
quirers and acquired banks. They seem compat-
ible with a situation in which the capitalization
of acquired banks is smaller than that of their
acquirers prior to the acquisition, but is im-
proved as a result of the acquisition.
What do our findings tell us about the risk
diversification motive for bank acquisitions?
They appear to disprove the notion that banks
use acquisitions as a means of boosting their
deposit insurance subsidy by increasing their
risk exposure. In this respect, our results ac-
cord well with those of Benston, Hunter, and
Wall (1995). However, our evidence is mute
about the other frequently suggested route for
increasing the deposit insurance subsidy—
becoming too big to fail. 
Although they indicate that acquisitions have
increased the banking industry’s profitability
and reduced its risk, our findings do not seem
to show that risk diversification is in itself a
major force driving bank acquisitions. If that
were the case, we would have observed a dis-
tinctly reduced risk for the new banking or-
ganizations that emerge with acquisitions. Our
sample of bank acquisitions shows a clear re-
duction for some measures of risk, but no clear
effect for others. Furthermore, when we com-
pare the postacquisition risk measures of the
newly formed banking organizations with the
preacquisition risk of the corresponding hypo-
thetical banking organizations, we find a more
pronounced reduction than when we compare
those same measures with the preacquisition
risk of the associated acquirers.
V. Final Remarks
Recent consolidation in the banking industry 
is producing less risky organizations. At the
same time, it is creating larger institutions for
which the too-big-to-fail policy is potentially
more valuable. The moral hazard of that policy
creates a widely recognized distortionary sub-
sidy. In the past, regulations limiting bank
acquisitions, especially interstate M&As, made
it difficult to exploit this subsidy. Recent dereg-
ulation allowing the development of nation-
wide banking has made it easier for banks to
diversify their risks, but it has also made it eas-
ier for them to grow. In other words, the per-
ception that banks could become too big (or
too important) to fail is more pertinent than
ever before. As a result, it is imperative that
banking supervisory agencies avoid sending
signals that might reinforce this perception.
n 8 The problems associated with estimation in the presence of a
random variable that lacks finite moments are well documented in the non-
parametric estimation literature (see, for example, Scott [1992]).
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Appendix: Impact of
Bank Acquisitions
T A B L E A 1
Impact of Bank Acquisitions 









Acquired –0.0011 –2.1600 –0.0186 0.7040 26.30 0.0008 0.0157
7.94e–09 0.2940 1.91e–07 0.5640 0.00027 1.06e–05 4.24e–10
Acquirer –0.0003 0.4150 –0.0036 0.5960 –11.10 0.0003 0.0085
0.00116 0.2860 0.00604 0.1460 0.22400 0.00051 2.73e–11
Both–Bothd –0.0005 3.8400 –0.0054 0.7620 32.80 0.0005 0.0099
7.56e–07 0.3850 9.71e–06 0.5240 0.00490 3.27e–07 3.87e–17
Both–Acquirere –0.0004 0.1530 –0.0046 0.2410 10.80 0.0001 0.0059
5.59e–05 0.6940 0.0002 0.5110 0.3530 0.1430 1.18e–07
a. Compares the measures of risk computed eight quarters after the acquisition with the same measures computed eight quarters before.
b. Represents the standard deviation of the return on assets, SA, and of the return on equity, SE.
c. Shows the coefficient of variation of the return on assets, CV A, and of the return on equity, CV E .
d. Compares the postacquisition risk of the newly formed banking organization (Both) with the preacquisition risk of the hypothetical bank
resulting from the sum of the acquired and the acquirer.
e. Compares the postacquisition risk of the newly formed banking organization (Both) with the preacquisition risk of the acquirer.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Return on Assets Return on Equity




1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
4 x 16 Time Frame
Covariance –6.03e–07 –1.29e–08 –1.12e–07 –1.37e–06 –9.56e–05 –1.98e–05 –1.98e–05 0.0002
0.2710 0.9750 0.7630 0.1560 0.2370 0.7640 0.7350 0.1430
a. Compares the covariance between the returns of the acquired and the acquirer before and after the acquisition.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
T A B L E A 2
Risk Effects Based on 
the Covariance of Returnsa
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T A B L E A 3
Impact of Bank Acquisitions on Riska
Years after Acquisition
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Acquired                              Acquirer                                
SA –0.0009 –0.0014 –0.0020 –0.0019 –0.0001 –0.0003 –0.0005 –0.0007
0.00044 1.91e–06 4.06e–11 4.27e–10 0.27500 0.03300 4.59e–05 1.42e–05
CVA 0.8950 1.4000 0.7060 0.2010 0.5060 0.8030 –0.0314 0.6810
0.3120 0.09740 0.1540 0.63200 0.11700 0.11500 0.9380 0.1230
SE –0.0156 –0.0277 –0.0308 –0.0299 –0.0009 –0.0026 –0.0050 –0.0070
0.00059 3.30e–06 4.77e–09 2.12e–08 0.51700 0.12200 0.00102 3.02e–05
CVE 0.8490 1.2800 0.8760 0.5360 –0.8950 –0.4890 –1.790 –0.6070
0.2690 0.0400 0.1910 0.33600 0.45000 0.6950 0.1610 0.6280
Z 20.200 51.100 85.700 66.000 –85.200 –65.30 –60.50 –28.00
0.5460 0.0342 0.1010 0.00124 0.3010 0.4320 0.4610 0.7460
Both–Both Both–Acquirer
SA –0.0003 –0.0005 –0.0007 –0.0008 –0.0002 –0.0004 –0.0006 –0.0007
0.00931 –0.00027 8.36e–09 1.94e–08 0.1670 0.00573 1.03e–06 1.69e–06
CV A –0.5140 –1.0600 –0.2800 –0.6210 0.3260 –0.2280 0.5660 0.2300
0.2170 0.0307 0.4890 0.1140 0.3810 0.6080 0.1090 0.48700
SE –0.0028 –0.0052 –0.0085 –0.0094 –0.0008 –0.0032 –0.0065 –0.0074
0.03520 0.00139 2.09e–07 8.62e–08 0.5530 0.03380 1.09e-05 5.59e–06
CVE –0.5850 –0.7740 –0.1030 –0.3160 –1.360 –1.5500 –0.8830 –1.100
0.2500 0.0439 0.7300 0.2160 0.2830 0.2020 0.4640 0.3590
Z 28.50 39.400 51.500 127.00 –73.40 –61.90 –51.80 24.300
0.1040 0.0256 0.0155 0.00943 0.3790 0.4540 0.5330 0.8010
a. Compares the measures of risk computed four quarters before the acquisition with the same measures computed four quarters the acquisi-
tion, four quarters of the second year after the acquisition, and so on.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Years after Acquisition
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Acquired Acquirer
RA 0.0007 0.0011 0.0017 0.0017 0.0002 0.0003 0.0005 0.0005
0.00066 8.08e–06 3.67e–09 1.02e–08 0.06620 0.00133 4.67e–05 0.00028
RE 0.0131 0.0224 0.0302 0.0309 0.0038 0.00791 0.0105 0.0123
0.00028 4.74e–08 2.50e–11 3.76e–11 0.00016 6.98e–09 1.33e–11 7.35e–15
Both–Both Both–Acquirer
RA 0.0003 0.0006 0.0008 0.0008 –0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004
0.0005 7.07e–07 6.88e–10 1.67e–08 0.25400 0.16500 0.00111 0.00773
RE 0.0055 0.0109 0.0146 0.0160 0.0004 0.0058 0.0095 0.0108
2.39e–06 2.37e–12 4.90e–17 3.40e–18 0.74000 8.52e–06 1.54e–10 1.95e–11
SOURCE:  Authors’ calculations.
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